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Abstract This paper aims to achieve more insight into the complex interplay
between the ‘‘external’’ market regulations and ‘‘internal’’ regulations (corporate
governance) of energy firms. In recent years, many countries have deregulated the
incumbent energy monopolies and have introduced new modes of regulation.
However, the new incentive schemes do not represent an unmitigated success
story. A major problem seems to be the neoclassical framework that is used for
the analysis of energy markets. Therefore, an important goal of this paper is to
clarify the boundaries of neoclassical regulation theory. There are two restrictions
that hamper the neoclassical analysis of energy markets. The first is the difficulty
of overcoming the widely held ‘‘black box’’ view of firms. The second is the idea
that agents always make rational choices. The paper proposes a kind of theoretical
division of labor for understanding the effectiveness of regulatory schemes in
energy markets. Neoclassical economics points out to the sources of market
failure, and helps to identify where in particular on the supply chain one is likely
to observe natural monopolies. Transaction cost economics explains appropriate
governance of vertical relations along the supply chain. And organizational the-
ories can elucidate what happens within firms: their response to regulation,
competition, and relations with suppliers. A research agenda for the third com-
ponent is proposed, drawing on insights from New Sociological Institutionalism
and organizational behavior.
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1 Outline
In recent years, the regulation of the electricity and gas markets (henceforth ‘‘energy
markets’’) has undergone substantial changes. Electricity markets in particular have
become more and more deregulated in most countries and have become the
forerunner in applying new modes of regulation (DG Competition 2007; Spence
2008). However, the deregulation of energy markets is not an unmitigated success
story. There is often the complaint that energy prices remain high, the investments
into the energy infrastructure (especially power plants and the power grid) are seen
to be too low, or the security of energy supply is lowering and the implementation of
green technologies is rather slow. To be true, yet it is not clear whether the state of
affairs would be better without deregulation. Also, the specific regulatory results
may vary from case to case and from country to country (see e.g. KEMA-report
2005; or Eurostat Electricity prices for EU households and industrial consumers).
For these reasons it is beyond this article to decide whether the newer regulation
schemes of the energy sector are based on an improper theory of (de-)regulation. In
the opposite, one can expect a learning process of regulators and regulated firms, in
which the regulation schemes are improved and regulatory outcomes become over
time more satisfying (for an example see Majumdar 1997).
The approach taken in this article is proposing that the incentive-based regulation
of energy markets could be improved, if insights from organizational science would
be considered more systematically for the design of the newer regulation schemes.
However, integrating insights of organizational science with the mainstream
approach of regulating energy markets is challenging and has to consider a
multitude of different aspects. For that reason this article has to be seen as a sort of
‘‘door opener’’ for further research and not as a ‘‘capstone’’ of an established
research agenda. Although this means that yet not all problems of that research
agenda have been fixed, it should become clear that there is added value of this line
of research, and that it is possible to derive some important policy conclusions from
this agenda.
In the following, first the neoclassical approach to regulating energy markets will
be briefly explained. Afterwards it will be discussed, why in neoclassical economics
the firm remains a ‘‘black box’’ and why corporate governance and organizational
issues are essential for a proper regulation of energy firms. The remaining portions
of the paper then consider in more detail organizational issues. Thereby insights
from New Sociological Institutionalism become integrated with mainstream
economic reasoning, in order to get a broader picture of the governance problems
which are involved in recent endeavors for better regulation of energy markets.
Especially the channeling of regulatory incentives through the corporate governance
to the decision making agents will be considered as well as in which way incentive
channeling may be improved.
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2 The boundaries of neoclassical analysis
2.1 Setup of the problem
In ordinary markets, competition is an automatic incentive device that makes sure
that, in the long run, only those sellers will prevail that can offer products at a
competitive price and that adopt efficient corporate governance structures. Those
firms which cannot manage for a properly working corporate governance structure
are subject to severe problems and may have to file for bankruptcy (Kole and Lehn
1997, 1999; Alchian 1950).
However, energy markets are different. While in ordinary markets production
functions have decreasing returns to scale, firms in energy markets operate with a
production function of increasing returns to scale, which leads to a market structure of
natural monopoly. The crucial point is that natural monopoly constitutes a sort of
market failure (Viscusi et al. 2005), and market selection is interrupted. That is, in the
case of a natural monopoly, there is no automatic mechanism that channels price
signals from competitive markets via the corporate governance structure through
the decision-making agent. Also, corporate governance structures will not adapt
automatically to efficiency-enhancing modes. On the contrary, profits from monopoly
power allow energy firms to conserve inappropriate governance structures (Kole and
Lehn 1997).
From a normative point of view, the structurally hampered market process
affords a sort of regulatory intervention that constrains the uncontrolled exercise of
monopoly power. Therefore, in the past, the energy sector has been heavily
regulated by jurisdictions. In many countries, energy firms became directly (e.g.,
France) or indirectly (e.g., Germany, Switzerland) state-owned—or, at least, the
government executed broad regulatory oversight over private energy firms (e.g., the
United States of America and the United Kingdom). The traditional regulation
schemes were intended to overcome the problem of natural monopoly and to
implement second-best solutions. However, over the years, it became clear that the
traditional method of regulating energy markets did not function well. Energy prices
remained high in comparison to the prices indicated for other markets (Goerten and
Clement 2006; Eurostat 2006), the investment in new technologies was low or
arbitrary, and customer service was bureaucratic (Mikkelsen et al. 2002). Therefore,
since the 1980s, a growing number of jurisdictions have tried to overcome these
undesirable results by implementing new kinds of regulation. All these new
regulatory policies have in common the fact that they aim to establish external
incentives for energy firms to become more efficient (incentive regulation) and
question the level of vertical integration of energy firms.
2.2 The refinements of market failure: of politicians and agents
In recent years, there have been two theoretical developments in regulation theory
that have aimed to improve the regulation of network industries in general and
energy firms in particular.
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The first development belongs to the Public Choice school (for an overview see
Mueller 2004). This school of thought claims that the strong influence of politics is
responsible for the inferior regulation of energy markets. The idea is that politicians
and bureaucrats are striving for office in order to maximize their individual benefits.
Politicians attempt to ensure their (re-)election to office through the presentation of
offers to voters (Downs 1957; Mueller 2004). For example, employees of energy
firms may be promised that they will be protected against energy imports from other
jurisdictions (Maloney et al. 1984), or the promise may be made that wages will be
marked up, that takeovers in the energy sector will be legally blocked or that certain
technologies will be discarded (like coal or nuclear power). All these political
initiatives raise the cost of energy. Like politicians, bureaucrats are also cost-drivers
of the energy sector because they seek more and more competencies (Niskanen
1971; Mueller 2004), in order to legitimate growing offices and retain influence.
That is, bureaucrats will invent more and more rules that have to be obeyed in
energy markets. In the end, the overregulation of energy markets and the
distribution of extra benefits generate an excess burden with regard to the costs
of regulation.
The important point is that Public Choice no longer assumes a benevolent
government as in neoclassical policy analysis. Quite the opposite is true: the
government is viewed as maximizing the utility of politicians, bureaucrats and
interest groups while putting the burden of regulation on the shoulders of citizens
who cannot escape regulation (Olson 1965; Mueller 2004). On this basis, Public
Choice concludes that energy markets have to be deregulated in order to prevent
growing political interference and a growing burden of undue costs and welfare
losses (Rossi 2008; Farber and Frickey 1991).
From the perspective of organization science, public choice has opened the
‘‘black box’’ of processes in the realm of politics, but Public Choice remains silent
with regard to the processes that are undertaken inside regulated firms. Therefore,
Public Choice represents a strong critique of neoclassical welfare economics but
assumes firms to be still represented by production functions.
The second development is not in opposition to neoclassical economics; it is
rather a series of specifications of neoclassical arguments. The first specification is
concerned with the vertical integration of energy firms. The question is which stage
of energy supply exactly constitutes natural monopoly. The idea is that the only link
in the supply chain that has to be regulated is the one characterized by a production
function with increasing returns (Knieps 2006; Brunekreeft 2002). For one to detect
this link, the supply chain has to be disaggregated. The supply chain of energy
consists of the stages of energy production, energy distribution and selling of
energy. While the stages of energy production and selling of energy are
characterized by a production function of decreasing returns, the distribution of
energy through the power grid is characterized by increasing returns (e.g. Knieps
2006), because the more energy-consuming units are connected to the grid, the more
the interconnection costs per unit will decrease.
The identification of the power grid as the regulatory bottleneck has apparent
consequences for the corporate governance of energy firms. Because only the
distribution of energy has the characteristics of a natural monopoly, it is the only
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part of the supply chain that has to be regulated. The other parts of the supply chain
can be left to free competition. The policy implication is straightforward because it
means that energy firms have to be vertically separated into autonomous units
(unbundling) whereby the regulatory bottleneck (distribution of energy) has to grant
free access to all producers and sellers of energy (for a discussion see Lyon and
Hackett 1993).
The second specification of neoclassical economics is concerned with the
informational asymmetries between the regulator and the (energy) firm which
controls the net-infrastructure. In accordance with principal agent theory, it is
assumed that the grid firm (agent) has superior information about the real costs of
energy distribution, while the regulator (principal) has only limited information
(Blackmon 1994; Laffont 1994; Kahn 2002). With the help of principal agent theory
it is possible to design regulations that are intended to set incentives for the grid firm
to reveal true costs (Blackmon 1994). This has become the basic idea of incentive
regulation.
In summary, the neoclassical analysis contributes to the question of when and
how energy markets should be regulated. But, blind spots remain. One is to view the
firm as a production function, which reduces the firm from an organizational science
perspective to a ‘‘black box’’ (Simon 1991; Williamson 1985). Alternatively,
neoclassical theory breaks up the firm into single relations between principals and
agents, but this is ignoring the idea that the various parts of an organization may be
held together not only by bilateral contracts but also by the glue of corporate culture,
identity or other processes of institutionalization (Tolbert and Zucker 1996; Scott
2001).
2.3 Lacunae of incentive regulation
Incentive regulation aims to mimic market incentives. The idea is that managers of
grid firms should be stimulated to use their superior knowledge about cost
reductions for making the distribution of energy more efficient (for an overview see
Vogelsang 2002; Laffont 1994). In order to achieve this aim, incentive regulation
makes a paradigmatic shift: Instead of regulating the costs of the net-infrastructure
directly (so-called cost-plus regulation), it specifies a ‘‘price cap’’ (Acton and
Vogelsang 1989; Littlechild 1983; Shleifer 1985). A ‘‘price cap’’ is the highest
possible price that the owner of the power grid can charge in exchange for granting
access to the grid for energy producers. If the owner of the power grid can manage
to reduce costs below the ceiling of the ‘‘price cap’’, he can keep the difference as an
extra profit. It is obvious that the managers of the grid firm have a strong incentive
to reduce costs in order to gain that extra profit. However, it is also true that grid
customers do not automatically gain an advantage from this sort of regulation
because they have to pay the ‘‘price cap’’ anyway. Also, consumers of energy
achieve no direct advantage. Therefore, the regulation authority must from time to
time revise the ‘‘price cap’’ downwards. The possible steps downwards are
determined by the presumed average cost reductions of the energy industry per
regulation period, which usually lasts between 3 and 5 years (Vogelsang 2002;
Braeutigam and Panzar 1993).
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There are two ways for separating the power grid from the production and sale of
energy: (1) the governance mode of ‘‘legal unbundling’’ and (2) the governance
mode of ‘‘ownership unbundling’’. In the case of legal unbundling, the power grid is
the property of an energy firm that is also engaged in the production and sale of
energy. However, under a legal unbundling regime, the power grid firm has to be an
independent legal entity (for example, a public limited company or private limited
company). It has the obligation to grant non-discriminatory access to the grid for all
competitors in energy markets and to serve as a ‘‘common carrier’’. In the case of
ownership unbundling, the grid firm becomes totally separated from the production
and sale of energy. The owners of the grid firm must not be engaged in the
production and sale of energy. Because the only operation of the grid firm is the
distribution of energy, it can be expected that the grid firm will grant equal access to
the grid for all producers of energy in order to maximize profits from the brokerage
of grid capacities.
Thus, the effectiveness of regulation does not solely depend on the employed
incentive scheme but also depends on access to the power grid and the vertical
organization of the energy supply as well. This makes it intuitively clear that
questions of corporate governance become highly relevant, as one has to ask in
which way incentive regulation interacts with the various parts of the supply chain.
Until now, however, the interaction of incentive schemes with the corporate
governance of energy firms has not received much attention (Joskow 1991, 2006).
The obvious question is whether the effectiveness of incentive regulation
depends on the legal form of unbundling. As yet, models of incentive regulation are
silent on this point because their focus is exclusively on the impact of external
regulations, whereby it is implicitly assumed that there are no countervailing effects
from corporate governance. It is largely ignored that corporate governance
represents a set of ‘‘internal regulations’’ of the firm to decision-makers.
Additionally, models of incentive regulation assume that all agents behave
rationally. However, this assumption may be too narrow for the analysis, given
that managers are bound to ‘‘external’’ as well as to ‘‘internal’’ regulations, which
both may produce contradictory incentives. It is questionable whether the resolution
of those incentive conflicts can be fully explained by rational choice models,
because it is often highly unclear for the decision-maker toward what end his
decision will lead (Zey 1998): On the one hand, obeying strictly ‘‘external’’
regulation may undermine a manager’s position within a firm hierarchy and may
deteriorate his prospective career. On the other hand, circumventing ‘‘external’’
regulation may imply the risk of being punished or fined by the regulator. That is
there may be a severe (intra) role conflict with the decision making agent. On the
one hand the agent may feel the obligation to act in the interest of his firm and to
maximize profits, although if doing so is against ‘‘external regulations’’. On the
other hand the agent may feel the obligation to act in the interest of society he also
belongs to and to obey ‘‘external regulations’’ (Armstrong 1978). So, managers will
often have to rely on heuristics in order to cope with the uncertainty that stems from
the parallelism of ‘‘internal’’ and ‘‘external’’ regulation (Tversky and Kahneman
1974; Kahneman et al. 1982; Festinger 1957). These heuristics may be biased, may
be false, or may at least mirror satisficing instead of maximizing behavior. In any
K. Heine
123
case, it is worth broadening the analysis by taking into account insights of
organizational behavior, in order to gain a better understanding of incentive
regulation.
3 Broadening the analytical framework
3.1 The need of institutional analysis
A result of the previous section is that a broadening of the analysis of energy
regulation is promising in two respects: First, taking into account the coincidence of
‘‘external’’ and ‘‘internal’’ regulation, and second, applying a richer model of man.
This broadening of the analysis is in line with the approach of modern institutional
analysis (Nee 2005; Campbell and Lindberg 1990), which can be roughly
differentiated into two schools. The first is New Institutional Economics, and the
second is New Sociological Institutionalism. Both approaches contribute to a better
understanding of organizational processes and hence to a better understanding of
channeling incentives through the corporate governance to the decision making
agent. However, there are important differences between the two approaches.
New Institutional Economics is a means of analyzing the self-interested but
bounded rational behavior of agents in governance structures on a micro level
(Williamson 1998; Furubotn and Richter 2005). This sort of analysis is goal-
oriented and can be used for institutional design, either on the level of ‘‘external’’
regulations (economic policy or law) or on the level of ‘‘internal’’ regulations
(corporate governance, contracts or firm strategy).
New Institutional Economics is not in general conflict with orthodox microeco-
nomics (North 1994; Posner 1993). It is rather an extension of microeconomic
analysis that takes into account the bounded rationality and opportunism of agents
(Richter 2005). New Institutional Economics asks in which way institutions
influence or constrain the selfish behavior of agents. Thereby, it is recognized that
agents are always embedded in more or less complex governance structures. The
firm is no longer a black box but is instead seen as a ‘‘nexus of contracts’’ (Jensen
and Meckling 1976). This allows for a refined analysis of incentives, which reveals
the many trade-offs at play when one aims to explain real-world behavior of agents
or to design institutions. With the help of New Institutional Economics, it is possible
to systematically analyze the complex governance structure of ‘‘internal’’ and
‘‘external’’ regulations. Thereby, the analysis of incentives is microanalytic, and the
focus is on the behavior of single agents (methodological individualism).
New Sociological Institutionalism is more composite and less microanalytic than
New Institutional Economics. Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 8) state that New
Sociological Institutionalism ‘‘… comprises a rejection of rational choice models,
an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and
cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of supra-individual units of
analysis ….’’ History plays a crucial role for the understanding of institutions, too,
whereby habitualization is an important trigger for institutionalization. For example,
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Berger and Luckman (1966, p. 54) explain: ‘‘Institutions … imply historicity and
control. Reciprocal typifications of actions are built up in the course of a shared
history. They cannot be created instantaneously. Institutions always have a history
of which they are the products.’’ This means that the institutionalization of markets
in general and of energy markets in particular may not adjust automatically towards
economic efficiency but may be the result of unique events and conditions in time
and space. It also spotlights the importance of political processes for the shaping of
institutions (Richter 2005; Granovetter 1985, 2005).
3.2 The corporate actor framework as a means of theory integration
It seems reasonable to argue for an analysis of energy markets, which integrates
insights from New Institutional Economics and New Sociological Institutionalism.
The aim of this sort of analysis is to gain deeper insight into the complex
interactions between incentive regulation and corporate governance. The necessity
of this task is clearly highlighted by Verma et al. (1999, p. 408): ‘‘Although the
theory [i.e., incentive regulation] predicts effects because of managers’ self-
interested objectives, the incentive programs built into the newer regulation produce
incentives for the firm, not necessarily for individual managers.’’ This quote points
to several analytical shortcomings of the new incentive based regulation schemes:
While incentive regulation is a big step forward to mimic market incentives for the
regulated firm, it neglects the fact that decision makers are always embedded into an
organizational environment. This neglect of organizational issues has been traced
back to an inconsistent application of methodological individualism in neoclassical
economics. While in general the neoclassical framework is based on methodological
individualism, governments and firms are seen as goal-oriented entities with an
objective utility function, which is either the maximization of welfare or profit
(Vanberg 1992; Moe 1984). That is, organizations are treated as individuals with a
consistent utility function, which is obviously a methodological inconsistency,
because organizations consist at least of two individuals, which entails the problem
of aggregating the preferences of individuals.
However, one may think of ‘‘complex objective functions’’ of the management of
grid firms. This is an indirect way for including organizational behavior as a
decisive factor into energy regulation. While usually it is assumed that a firm
behaves like a single profit maximizing agent, this approach assumes that the
management may aim at other goals than profit maximization (Baumol 1959; Marris
1963; Williamson 1963). Management may be more interested in the maximization
of sales, firm growth or spending money for lavish offices, extra secretarial services,
luxury cars etc. The important point is that management becomes identified as a
distinct organizational layer of the firm. Then the firm consists of at least two
organizationally distinct groups: The firm owners and the management. This
separation makes it possible to construct complex objective functions of firm
behavior, which go beyond simple profit-maximization. For example, one may put
sales, growth rate, profit and managerial amenities as weighted variables in an
objective function of management, with which then firm behavior may be predicted.
Also psychological factors may become arguments of that objective function; for
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example management may use certain routines and heuristics to achieve its goals
instead of maximizing utility in each single case.
External regulation can be easily aimed at specific arguments in the objective
function. But despite its seemingly great intuition one can question whether the
approach of complex objective functions really solves the problem of aligning
organizational issues with incentive regulation. The rationale for this is that the
approach of complex objective functions, similarly to the black box view of the firm,
assumes a single decision maker. Now the single decision making agent is the
management to whom a complex objective function is ascribed (Leibenstein 1979).
The essence of the organizational problem is not touched by the approach of
complex objective functions. If there is only one manager who is maximizing his
complex utility function, than no problem exists. But what meaning can be given to
a situation, if a group of managers makes a decision? Different managers may have
different aims and may weigh the arguments of the complex objective function
differently. How become the different utility functions of the managers aggregated?
It can be assumed that the larger the management group is and the greater the
number of arguments in the complex objective function are that the greater the
problem (Jensen 2001). That is, only the assertion about the behavior of the black
box has changed, not the analytical perspective to treat firms as black boxes
(Leibenstein 1979).
The approach of complex objective functions is silent on the meaning of group
size and differences in power of group members, because the approach is lacking an
understanding of hierarchical conflict resolution mechanisms. Thereby it can be
assumed that not only formal power relations shape group decisions, but also
informal relations between group members influence group decisions (Leibenstein
1979; French and Raven 1959). In the end it is dubious whether a complex objective
function can accurately mirror group decisions and the organizational behavior of
firms. As a consequence it is also doubtful that regulations which are aimed at
arguments of a complex objective function are smart enough to adequately change
organizational behavior. What is lacking is a better understanding of the internal
operations of a firm, which subsequently can be linked to a firm’s legal framework.
In order to circumvent the problem of complex objective functions and to ground
the analysis in methodological individualism, it is possible to interpret firms as a
nexus of bilateral contracts between equal individuals (Alchian and Demsetz 1972;
Jensen and Meckling 1976). An important consequence of this view is that the
market-paradigm becomes extended to organizational issues and that the idea of
organization boils down to a mere ‘‘legal fiction’’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Another important consequence of this approach is that the intra-firm relation
between the employee and the centralized contractual agent (employer) is seen as a
relation of equal powers; that is, an employee can leave as easily the firm as a buyer
can switch to another grocer (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Surely, it is possible to
think of more complex settings, but what is important is that in the nexus of
contracts approach key characteristics of organizations are ignored, like the features
of power or loyalty (Simon 1991). However, these are important characteristics of
organizations which have a large impact on the behavior of decision makers.
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In order to overcome the ‘‘black box’’ view of the firm on the one hand and to
avoid the negation of the idea of organization by extending the market-paradigm
onto intra-organizational relations, it is possible to conceive of the firm as a
corporate actor (Coleman 1974; Vanberg 1992). In its external relationships, a
corporate actor appears as a legal person with a uniform decision-making process
and the ability to take part in business transactions. In its internal relationships, a
corporate actor consists of a net of contracts between single actors or groups of
actors. The corporate contract (corporate law) is the pivotal element of the internal
decision-making process, which equilibrates the sometimes divergent interests of
stakeholders and serves as a sort of constitution of the firm (Vanberg 1992).
However, because corporate law cannot foresee all possible conflicts, the corporate
contract remains incomplete (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991; Hansmann 2006),
which allows actors to pursue their own aims to a certain degree and to deviate from
rational maximizing behavior.
The methodological underpinning of the idea to conceive of firms as corporate
actors is methodological individualism—decisions and actions can only be made by
human individuals (Vanberg 1992; Coleman 1974). However, individual decision
making and individual behavior within a firm is always interrelated and has to be
coordinated. That is, the social mechanisms which underlie intra-organizational
coordination are an important part of the analysis, if one is out to understand firm
behavior.
The corporate governance of firms can be understood as the formal constitution
of a corporate actor, which mirrors the social mechanisms of individuals who are
trying to coordinate their individual decisions and actions. Thereby the coordinated
actions of individuals may aim at profit-maximization, as neoclassical economics
suggests. But, a corporate actor may also pursue other goals as long as he can
manage for financial stability and legitimacy (Vanberg 1992; see also Alchian
1950).
What is important is that viewing firms as corporate actors makes it possible to
base the analysis of organizations on methodological individualism and coinciden-
tally to make a difference between organizational and individual behavior. In
addition, the idea to conceive a firm’s corporate governance as a constitutional
contract allows integrating external regulations in a systematic way into the analysis
of regulated firms. That is, external regulations may be understood as a sort of
public constraint of the decision-making processes within a regulated firm. These
constraints become effective by prescribing a certain market performance (e.g. a
price cap), a certain market behavior (e.g. no discrimination of competitors, if they
are using the net-infrastructure) or a certain market structure (e.g. legal or ownership
unbundling of the grid firm).
In any case a decision maker of a regulated firm has to take into consideration
both, the constitutional constraints of internal regulations (corporate governance) as
well as external regulations. Thereby he has some degrees of freedom, because the
private constitutional contract (corporate governance) and the public constitutional
contract (regulation) remain incomplete and leave room for decisions, which may be
in the interest of the decision maker but not necessarily in the interest of a firm’s
shareholders or the public. However, the incompleteness of internal and external
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regulations is not the only problem, there is also the problem that internal and
external regulations may set contradictory constraints and incentives for the
decision making agent. So, the question arises, in which way the decision making
process will be affected, if there is left some room for individual decisions, which
are neither constrained by internal nor external regulations, or if there are internal
and external regulations which set contradictory constraints and incentives for the
decision making agent.
In the following the idea of the firm as a corporate actor will be employed to
integrate insights from New Sociological Institutionalism on the macro-level of firm
behavior and insights from organizational behavior on the micro-level, in order to
get a better understanding of the interaction of incentive regulation and corporate
governance. Thereby the problem of incentive channeling will be center stage.
4 Incentive channeling through corporate governance structures
4.1 Bridging the gap between regulation and corporate governance
A starting-point for structuring the problem of incentive channeling is transaction
cost economics. Transaction cost economics belongs to New Institutional
Economics, but qualifies as a bridge to insights of the behavioral theory of the
firm as well as to New Sociological Institutionalism (Nee 2005).
Transaction cost economics analyzes different modes of coordination that range
between markets and hierarchies, thereby appreciating bounded rationality of agents
and culture as important underlying for theory building (for an overview, see
Williamson 1998). The notion of bounded rationality has led to sometimes fierce
debates, whether transaction cost economics is alienable with neoclassical thinking
(Furubotn and Richter 2005) and whether bounded rationality is a valuable concept
at all (Posner 1993). Here it is not possible to discuss all arguments of that debate,
however one can conclude that transaction cost economics has triggered a sort of
‘‘sociological turn’’ in economics, motivated by difficulties in explaining institutions
within the framework of neoclassical economic theory (Nee 2005; Furubotn and
Richter 2005).
In the epicenter of transaction cost economics is the ‘‘transaction’’, which may be
broadly understood as every kind of exchange between two or more agents.
Transactions are a part of all kinds of contracts or binding arrangements, including
purchase contracts, employment contracts, corporate law or regulations. Those
contracts belong in turn to the entire institutional environment, which might be
comprised of the judicial system, the political system or the set of informal rules
mediated by culture (for an overview see Nee 2005). In addition, transactions
depend on the technological specifics of goods and services—for example, whether
a transaction demands sunk investments or not (Williamson 1998). In any event,
transactions produce costs, and the question is which governance mode minimizes
those costs. That is, whenever a transaction via the market mechanism fails, than
hierarchical coordination may be in order because hierarchical coordination may
save transaction costs (Williamson 1998).
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In the case of energy firms, one has to determine the governance mode that
minimizes the transaction costs of coordinating the energy supply chain. A
hierarchical coordination of activities is given, if there is a bundling of the
production, distribution and sale of energy in a legal entity, which serves as a parent
company (e.g. a management holding) making all strategic decisions along the value
chain. It can be argued that this governance mode is the most transaction cost-saving
for energy firms because there are significant sunk costs associated with the power
grid and substantial expenditures related to its technical operation, as well as the
coordination between the production of energy and its transmission via the grid
(Joskow 2006). More generally, the exploitation of synergies and complementarities
between the production, distribution and sale of energy calls for integrated
hierarchical coordination (Stieglitz and Heine 2007).
But, putting the energy supply chain under the control of integrated management
raises a dilemma: On the one hand, integrated management may reduce transaction
costs, bring forward synergies and enhance productivity; on the other hand, the
power grid is a natural monopoly that may be abused to leverage monopoly power
from the distribution of energy toward the production and sale of energy. For
example, an integrated energy firm may impede access to the grid for competitors
by giving priority to its own operations and run short the capacity of the grid. In
effect, reducing the capacity of the grid retains monopoly profits and causes welfare
losses.
At first glance, the described trade-off seems trivial, but it is of the utmost
importance because it underpins the hypothesis that corporate governance is
essential for attaining efficiency of energy supply. However, such efficiency
depends not only on corporate governance but also on regulation. That is, only the
simultaneous fine-tuning of corporate governance and regulation will enable an
efficient energy supply.
There is no clear empirical evidence, whether the distortive effects on
competition or the gains from synergies of an integrated supply chain of energy
are larger. However, empirical studies indicate that the welfare gains from increased
competition in case of ownership unbundling probably outweigh potential
disruptions of synergies (Pollitt 2008). Thereby Steiner (2001) highlights the point
that unbundling is superior to integration, when there is an advanced competition
policy in place, which backups the (de-)regulation of the energy sector. Insofar
ownership unbundling alone may not lead to welfare gains but have to be seen as a
part of a whole package for restructuring energy markets.
The picture becomes complete, if one considers that there may exist a continuum
of combinations of corporate governance modes and regulations. For example,
Monteverde and Teece (1982) have shown that Ford and General Motors have
adopted a pattern of vertical integration, which fits into the legal-institutional
environment of the United States and which protects rents from the firms’
knowledge-base, like specialized human capital or patents. In Japan car manufac-
turers have adapted to another pattern of vertical integration, whereby a different
culture of industrial relations, which is based on trust, protects the firms’
knowledgebase. The important insight of this study is that governance modes are
path dependent and they co-evolve together with their institutional environment.
K. Heine
123
Thereby different combinations of corporate governance and regulation may attain
equal levels of efficiency. With respect to incentive channeling on energy markets
one can conclude from this study that it is highly likely that there will be not only
one way, in order to facilitate incentive channeling, but depending on the unique
institutionalization and history of energy markets in each country the appropriate
regulatory measures may vary.
It is apparent that transaction cost economics seemingly has a lot to contribute to
the understanding of the interrelation between corporate governance and the
regulation of energy firms, as well as to the appropriate design of corporate
governance and regulations of the energy sector. Amazingly enough, public policy
has remained by and large unaffected by the insights of transaction cost economics.
This appraisal has been underpinned by Paul Joskow (1991, p. 77): ‘‘However,
while transaction cost economics has played a role in the debates about vertical
restructuring in these industries, and the precise form that such restructuring should
take, it is my sense that the direct role of transaction cost considerations in
influencing the direction of public policy has, so far, been quite modest.’’
In order to analyze the behavior of agents in vertically integrated energy firms or
unbundled grid firms in more detail, one can ask whether the processing of external
incentives through the corporate governance of regulated firms is different from that
of firms in unregulated markets. An important difference between the two kinds of
firms exists with regard to their selection environment. Under the conditions of
workable competition, market forces select firms. If a firm cannot satisfy the
preferences of consumers, it has to face bankruptcy (Alchian 1950). That is,
incentives are going straight from consumers via the corporate veil to decision-
making agents. These market-driven incentives are high-powered and lead to an
efficient outcome. In other words, in order to survive competition, firms will have to
adapt corporate governance structures which lead to a minimization of transaction
costs. As a result, firms may experiment with new forms of corporate governance or
may institutionalize a sort of corporate culture that supports the channeling of
incentives. The decentralized discovery procedure of competition (Hayek 2002)
automatically reveals which firms have the best ideas in order to tackle the problem
of incentive channeling (Kole and Lehn 1997, 1999; for a recent survey of the
literature see Love 2010).
In regulated markets, there is no such automatism. Instead, the regulator
artificially forms the selection environment by granting monopoly and simulta-
neously regulating prices and quality. The point is that consumers cannot freely
choose between different products and services but have to take the offers that have
been pre-specified by the regulator. This implies an important consequence: While
in ordinary markets, firms have to look at the preferences of consumers, the
regulated firm looks at the statutory requirements and tries to capture the regulator
(Mueller 2004; Peltzman 1976; Etzioni 2009). A financial analyst has aptly pictured
this concept: ‘‘When you buy the securities of a utility, you’re buying the public
utilities commission’’ (Business Week 1979, p. 114). To put it another way, there is
a close relationship between the regulator and the regulated firm, and it seems
plausible that this sort of embeddedness of the regulated firm in the framework of
regulation makes a strong imprint (Stinchcombe 1965; Johnson 2007) on the formal
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and informal governance of regulated firms. For example, studies of the US
electricity industry have shown that tight regulatory oversight leads to a more
formal organization of electricity firms, reduced entrepreneurial initiative and
paternalistic working relationships (Russo 1992). One might argue that the mindset
of the public regulation authority is copied into the organizational routines of the
regulated firm.
However, imprinting has another effect that is as important as the transfer of
organizational routines from the regulator to the regulated firm. Organizational
routines are often persistent or path-dependent (Nelson and Winter 1982; Narduzzo
and Warglien 2008; Russo 1992). That is, one cannot easily switch from one mode
of corporate governance to another or intensify incentives in order to promptly
develop an efficient output of regulated firms. For example, if a public utility has no
performance-based career system, such a career system will not emerge overnight.
Instead, there will be a period of transition before external incentives become
mirrored by organizational routines and external incentives can pass through
corporate governance structures.
The implementation problem is non-existent in neoclassical economics. How-
ever, the imprinting, institutionalization and path dependence of organizational
routines are important building blocks for a better understanding of the working of
external incentives in the corporate governance structures of regulated firms (for a
general discussion see Santos and Eisenhardt 2005).
In summary, in energy markets it cannot be assumed that the corporate
governance structures of firms adapt automatically to the transaction cost minimal
solution. On the contrary, the market failure of natural monopoly is mirrored in the
governance structure of either power grid firms or vertically integrated energy firms.
From this follows that the regulation of energy markets involves both external and
internal regulation, as well as the complementary fine-tuning of external and
internal regulations. Thereby a division of labor between different theoretical
branches is looming: (1) Neoclassical economics yields insight into the kind and
degree of market failure, as well as which part of the supply chain of energy firms
contains market failure; (2) transaction cost economics informs about the efficient
design of vertical coordination between the different parts of the supply chain and
highlights potential conflicts with antitrust issues; and (3) theories of organizational
behavior produce a nuanced account of the motives and attitudes of decision-
making agents within given corporate governance structures. While in the previous
chapters neoclassical economics and transaction cost economics were center stage,
the next chapter will highlight insights from organizational behavior and New
Sociological Institutionalism.
4.2 Looking inside the ‘‘black box’’: the working of incentive regulation
within energy firms
The corporate actor framework makes it possible to combine insights from New
Institutional Economics with New Sociological Institutionalism by thinking of firms
as constitutional contracts of individual actors, which are constrained by external
regulations. Thereby the constitutional contract of the firm builds up the firm’s
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corporate governance. However, the constitutional contract is incomplete and leaves
room for individual decisions of agents, who may behave not in accordance with
rational choice theory. In addition, there may be informal rules in play, which are
not embraced by formal rules of corporate governance and which cannot be changed
easily by will, but are subject to larger processes of societal and cultural
development.
External regulation, like incentive regulation, has to take into account both, the
consequences of the incompleteness of the firm’s constitutional contract as well as
the existence of informal rules, which may belong to the firm level (corporate
culture) as well as to the level of whole societies. In the following this will be
elucidated in more detail by highlighting some important problems, which have
been until now largely neglected in the literature on incentive regulation. The aim is
to set up a research agenda, which pops up when the ‘‘black-box’’ of energy firms is
opened.
4.2.1 Clarity and comprehensibility of incentives
It can be assumed that incentive schemes work more properly if the targeted results
are well defined and the causal link between incentives and the subsequent
(re)actions of energy firms are verifiable. Verification as an important ingredient of
incentive schemes on energy markets is in accordance with findings in research on
organizational behavior and social psychology (Kahneman et al. 1982; London
2003; Le´on 1997) as well as in New Institutional Economics (Furubotn and Richter
2005; Ritz and Sager 2010). That is, even if the relation between the regulator and
the regulatee is complex and outcomes are opaque, all kinds of behavior control
should be complemented by a sort of outcome control (Verma et al. 1999;
Eisenhardt 1985). The reason is that clear-cut defined regulatory outcomes, or at
least verifiable outcome proxies, may help to prevent a subtle deviation from the
initially defined regulatory aims. Such deviations are likely because the sometimes
strong ties between the regulator and the regulated firms may allow energy firms to
influence the regulator and to obtain relaxations of initial regulations. For example,
former managers of energy firms frequently become members of the regulation
authority. This allows former managers to thwart regulation and to conserve the
monopoly profits of energy firms (Knittel 2006). This ‘‘regulatory capture’’ (Stigler
1971) may be prevented if the aims of regulation are made transparent and verifiable
by the public.
Another point is that incentives should be straightforward and comprehensible
(Pfeifenberger and Tye 1995). This requirement, again, is in line with findings in
research on organizational behavior and social psychology (Kahneman et al. 1982;
Le´on 1997). Straightforwardness and comprehensibility are important ingredients of
incentive schemes because the recipients of incentives will more easily adapt to
those incentives. That is, only if the regulatee understands the workings of the
incentive scheme will he be able to respond properly and fulfill the aims of
regulation. In addition, a plain and clear-cut incentive scheme is also advantageous
for the regulator, because it is easier to control energy firms if the yardstick of
regulation is not ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. However, at first
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glance, from the perspective of New Sociological Institutionalism, this seems not to
be evident. Straightforwardness and comprehensibility is seen more as a sort of
rationalized procedure that creates the image of rational choices rather than the
reality. Or, to put it in the words of Meyer and Rowan (1991, p. 53): ‘‘…
organizational success depends on factors other than efficient coordination and
control of productive activities.’’ Thus, the emphasis placed by rational-choice
theorists on formal procedure as a means to produce more rational decisions
becomes undermined by New Sociological Institutionalism. However, New
Sociological Institutionalism does not completely disregard technical efficiency.
In case that organizational output is easily measurable, when productive technol-
ogies are well defined, and when criteria of success are unambiguous, then technical
efficiency matters (Carruthers 1995). In this respect Meyer and Rowan (1991)
explicitly mention public utilities, and one may conclude that a straightforward and
comprehensible design of incentive regulation is also a worthwhile aim from the
perspective of New Sociological Institutionalism.
Clarity and comprehensibility of incentive schemes seem to be evident or even
trivial requirements of incentive regulation. However, in reality, these requirements
are frequently ignored (Pfeifenberger and Tye 1995; Buechner and Katzfey 2006).
For example, the British regulation of electricity grid firms employs an incentive
formula that aims to considering numerous characteristics of grid firms in order to
determine the optimal incentive. The formula is supposed to establish optimal
incentives for grid firms, leading to an increase in productivity. In addition, the
formula aims to cover the costs of running the grid and ensuring a secure supply of
energy (for the complete formula, see OFGEM 2008).
Every term in the formula for the British ‘‘revenue cap’’ has its justification and
has been discussed at length in academic and political circles, as well as by the
scientific board of the OFGEM (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets). However,
one can ask whether the complexity of the formula and the manifold data needed
to feed the formula may thwart the aim of setting optimal incentives and
achieving efficient regulatory outcomes. What is still missing in the debate on
incentive regulation is a more detailed discussion of other straightforward
instruments of incentive regulation. Those other instruments of incentive
regulation may not be as sophisticated as the current incentive schemes, yet
these other incentive schemes might be highly effective (for an early statement see
Pfeifenberger and Tye 1995).
A strong candidate for such a clear-cut and comprehensible instrument is the
length of the regulation period. The longer the regulation period, the stronger is the
incentive for cost reduction, as energy firms have a longer amount of time to capture
the difference between the price ceiling (price or revenue cap) and the true costs
(Joskow 2006; Baumol and Klevorick 1970; Vogelsang 2002). For example,
statistical estimations for Austrian grid firms point to a sharp increase in the
incentive to reduce costs when the regulation period is extended from 5 to 10 years.
If the regulation period is 5 years, then there is an incentive to reduce costs by about
28%, while a regulation period of 10 years produces an incentive to reduce costs of
about 49% (Groenli and Haberfellner 2002). Therefore, it may be advantageous to
grant longer regulation periods and simultaneously to simplify the regulation
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formula in order to have a more focused incentive to reduce costs. In addition, this
may block opportunities for energy firms to bargain for cost categories, which are
exempted from incentive regulation. That is, the aim of incentive regulation
becomes much clearer, and energy firms have a strong impetus to pass incentives
through the corporate governance structure.
Finally, it is interesting that the European Commission has recently taken steps
which aim at an improvement of clarity and comprehensibility of regulation by
drafting a proposal on energy market integrity and transparency (European
Commission 2010). Even though this proposal is not directly concerned with
incentive regulation, it is stated in this paper that ‘‘citizens, business and
authorities must have confidence in the integrity of these wholesale energy
markets’’ (European Commission 2010, p. 2). For this aim the Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), which has been newly founded (EC
No 713/2009), will collect relevant data of energy markets and make them
centrally available for the public. In addition, under the heading ‘‘Clear and
consistent rules’’ the proposal states that the clearness and consistency of the
ruling against abusive market practices are important aims of energy regulation.
However, the future will reveal, if these intentions of the Commission become
implemented by the national regulators and whether the clarity and comprehen-
sibility of regulation will be improved.
4.2.2 Incentive compatibility
Another important point on the research agenda is compatibility between the
‘‘external’’ incentives of energy regulation and the aims of decision-makers
‘‘within’’ the firm. Two examples may clarify the importance of incentive
compatibility:
1. ‘‘Legal Unbundling’’ commands a governance structure that grants managers
of grid firms a widely unaffected management of the grid. The underlying
idea is that managers of grid firms should care about the efficient supply of
grid services and should not discriminate between the different customers of
the grid (Brunekreeft and Ehlers 2006). That is, incentive compatibility
requires that parent companies of grid firms do not interfere into the decision-
making of grid firms—for example, into the allocation of grid capacity or
investments in the grid. To put it simple, under a legal unbundling regime,
corporate governance must shield grid firm managers against the direct or
indirect intervention of parent companies. This legal shield against interven-
tions has to be rather strong, because market forces do not automatically
correct undue interventions by parent companies. In normal markets, undue
interventions by a parent company into the operations of an affiliated
company may lead to the bankruptcy of the affiliation, whereas in regulated
markets, those interventions may only result in a loss of efficiency—the
monopoly position will secure profits anyway.
2. Incentive compatibility demands that decision-makers can satisfy their
individual preferences and reach their goals within the constraints of corporate
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governance structures. If external regulation does not respect individual
preferences, then regulation may produce unintended consequences (Verma
et al. 1999). For example, under a ‘‘legal unbundling’’ regime, the career of a
grid manager may depend on the manager’s contribution to the overall profit of
the holding company. However, if there is the legal obligation to give non-
discriminatory access to the grid for competitors of the holding company, then
the manager of the grid firm faces a severe trade-off. On the one hand, the
manager may comply with regulation, taking into account the possibility that
his career may deteriorate. On the other hand, the manager can apply
sophisticated tools of discrimination in order to derogate the competitors of the
holding company, which may increase his career chances but may also expose
him to the risk of being punished by the regulator. To be clear, whether grid
managers decide on one or the other option depends on a multitude of factors,
but the trade-off points again to the crucial interdependence of corporate
governance and external regulation when one means to regulate energy firms
effectively.
In order to attain incentive compatibility between ‘‘external’’ regulations and the
goals of managers one has to design the corporate governance of grid firms
adequately. An appropriate economic tool box for shaping corporate governance
and to align the goals of regulation and the goals of managers is provided by
‘‘mechanism design’’ (Groves and Ledyard 1987), which in recent years has got a
lot of attention for a proper regulation of energy markets (Silva et al. 2001; Battle
and Perez-Arriaga, Batlle and Perez-Arriaga 2008). The idea is to ‘‘manipulate’’ the
institutional environment of managers in a way that they behave in a manner that is
compatible with the aims of regulation. However, mechanism design relies strongly
to the assumption of rationality and selfishness of agents (Groves and Ledyard
1987), which may be seen as an obstacle to applying this concept to real world
problems, when agents often deviate from rational behavior (McFadden 2009).
Therefore it is useful to analyze the problem of incentive compatibility also from the
perspective of New Sociological Institutionalism, which does not rely on the
rationality assumption. From that perspective an agent will align the goals of
regulation with his own goals, if there is sense-making possible (Weick et al. 2005).
Sense-making is possible, if the agent can attribute to regulations, corporate
governance or other institutions an inherent logic and legitimacy as well as he can
link his experience to the challenges of regulation. If institutional settings make
sense, then the agent is more willing to accept regulations and to adapt his behavior
to the logic of institutional constrains. For example, incentive regulation may be
obeyed more easily, if the regulation scheme makes sense not only from the
perspective of cutting the costs of the power grid, but also if incentive regulation is
in accordance with environmental protection and if cutting costs does not threat the
jobs in the energy sector.
As it turns out, New Sociological Institutionalism may be a helpful tool to get
deeper insight into the sense-making of energy regulation, if the proper behavior of
managers depends on the concerted interplay between ‘‘external’’ regulations and
corporate governance.
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4.2.3 Magnitude and reliability of incentives
Managers of grid firms will be more likely to comply with regulations if the
magnitude of regulations is strong and if regulations are reliable. This proposition is
intuitive and has been recently proved by experimental studies of mechanism design
(McFadden 2009).
The design of corporate governance has a significant effect on the magnitude of
regulatory incentives because corporate governance rules decide, which incentives
are eligible and which are not. For example, under a regime of ‘‘legal unbundling’’
the regulator may decide that the profits of the grid firm have to be reinvested into
the power grid and should be not transferred to the parent company. Such a legal
obligation diminishes the incentive to disinvest into the grid and to lower the net
capacity, while it strengthens the incentive to allocate the capacity of the power grid
efficiently. Or, the regulator might forbid bonus wage systems for power grid firms,
which are linked to the overall profit of the parent company. That is, grid managers
should not indirectly profit from discrimination against competitors. If a bonus wage
system is installed, then it seems to be more reasonable for that system to refer to
the increase in productivity of grid firms per period. In that case, it is more likely
that incentives become properly channeled through the corporate body of grid firms.
Under a regime of ‘‘ownership unbundling’’ the incentive for managers of grid
firms to disinvest into the power grid may be even higher, in order to obtain—at
least for a short term—a high rate of return. Therefore, even stronger legal
obligations seem to be in order to counterbalance the incentive to disinvest into the
grid capacity. Also the bonus wage system should not refer to the rate of return of
the grid firm, because that would incentivize disinvestment. Otherwise, discrimi-
nation between suppliers of energy seems to be no problem under a regime of
‘‘ownership unbundling’’.
It becomes clear that the design of corporate governance leads to different
weights of the various incentives that are in play, and that the regulator has to pick
appropriate regulations which press grid managers to behave in accordance with the
aims of regulation.
The reliability of regulations is also of great importance to the targeting of
incentives (Stern 1997; Hall et al. 2000). This point entails several aspects. The first
is that incentives have to be enduring and must be repeated so that decision-makers
can adapt their behavior. The second is that incentives must not be subject to
renegotiations. That is, managers should make an effort to adapt their behavior and
not attempt to manipulate regulations. The third aspect is that rewards from
regulatory compliance must follow promptly, in order to underscore the causal link
between regulatory compliance and rewards.
The magnitude and reliability of incentives mirror a well-known pair of
parameters in economics that has especially been applied in the economic theory of
crime (Becker 1968). The first is the level of punishment, and the second is the
likelihood of detection. While the magnitude of the incentives may be interpreted as
the level of punishment, the reliability of the incentives can be interpreted as the
likelihood of one’s becoming detected in committing a crime. The stronger the
magnitude of the incentives and the higher the reliability of the regulation, the more
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compliance with regulation can be expected. Even if one is of the opinion that
organizational behavior is not the result of such a simple calculus, the magnitude
and reliability of incentives are important parameters for the design of corporate
governance of grid firms. In addition, it seems that different mixes of magnitude and
reliability of incentives may yield in the end the same regulatory result.
However, one can ask whether New Sociological Institutionalism can add
insights to the interplay of governance structures and the magnitude and reliability
of regulation of grid firms. In this regard an important argument is coined by
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 152). They hold that organizations ‘‘tend to model
themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more
legitimate or successful.’’ That is grid firms may adapt their organizational structure
in response to corporate governance rules and certain regulations, however the
realized organizational form may be not the result of a firm’s considerations how to
improve its economic efficiency. The organizational form may be more influenced
by ‘‘mimetic’’ processes that focus on well established and legitimized organiza-
tional routines and structures of an industry. If that argument by DiMaggio and
Powell were true, then aspects of organizational legitimization must be taken into
consideration, when one is out to determine the efficient mix of the magnitude and
reliability of incentives. For example, bonus wages which are linked to the overall
profit of the parent company may lead to economically inefficient behavior of grid
managers. However, this sort of bonus wage system may be seen as the legitimate
one, and to forbid this system may provoke counter actions of managers, in order to
circumvent the prohibition. That is New Sociological Institutionalism points out that
a sort of ‘‘command and control’’ regulation has limitations, if it is not embedded
into an organization’s social context.
4.2.4 Authorization
Managers have to be authorized to take all appropriate measures in order to react to
incentive regulation in a coordinated manner. For example, under a regime of
incentive regulation grid managers have to decide on two important things: (1) The
access price for using the grid and (2) the budgeting of investments into the grid. It
is obvious that these two tasks are highly interrelated. The access price, in
combination with the grid capacity, determines the potential profit of the grid firm.
On the other hand, the grid capacity depends on the investments into the grid.
Therefore, the management of access prices and investments into the grid should be
bundled as part of the same division, in order for there to be integrated management
of grid capacities and access prices. In addition, this sort of integrated management
points to the need for a fine-tuned accounting system that mirrors the requirements
of incentive regulation on the one hand and provides all information necessary for
the management to react in a concerted way on the other.
If the authority to react to incentive regulation is split (for example, if the
planning of investments into the grid occurs in the finance division while the
determination of access prices occurs in the sales division) there may occur severe
frictions, which complicates proper reaction to incentive regulation. The external
incentive will be diffused in the corporate governance structure of grid firms, and
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incentive regulation may provoke contradictory reactions. The finance division may
plan for an extension of the net capacity, while the sales division may plan with a
constant net capacity. Although it is somewhat overstated, this simple example
makes clear that the allocation of authority plays a crucial role not only in the proper
processing of incentive regulation in corporate governance structures but also in
deriving a consistent strategy for how to react on incentive regulation.
Therefore it seems pretty clear that grid firms should strive for an allocation of
management tasks, which leads to a concerted management of activities. Regulation
should avoid that a proper managerial planning of the power grid becomes
hampered. This requirement is by no means trivial as the case of ‘‘accounting
unbundling’’ shows. One can certainly imagine economically efficient modes of
‘‘accounting unbundling’’. However, in practice it is not sure that those systems
become implemented. This may trace back to opportunistic actions of agents, but
may be also explained by processes of institutionalization of corporate governance:
Energy firms may adapt to that sort of internal accounting system which has the
greatest legitimacy in the energy sector, irrespective of the consequences for
economic efficiency.
4.2.5 Legitimacy
As already mentioned legitimacy plays an important role in the implementation of
incentive schemes. By the term ‘‘legitimacy’’ in general is meant a procedural
quality of corporate governance that relates to democratic accountability (partic-
ipation), the separation of powers, transparency, and the rule of law (Coglianese
2007). That is, an organization is seen as legitimate if it is in accordance with the
basic principles of the social organization of men, or, in terms of New Sociological
Institutionalism: Corporate governance is legitimate if it is embedded in the larger
institutional context of societal living (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Granovetter
1985) and if there are no contradictions between societal and organizational rules.
Legitimacy does not have to be in conflict with economic efficiency. However, there
can be conflicts if organizational rules enforce efficient behavior but this sort of
behavior is not in accordance with the moral frame or accepted routines of society.
In such a case, efficient behavior is seen as illegitimate.
The point is that economic consequences of incentive regulations that are
regarded as illegitimate may provoke organizational behavior that runs against the
proper working of incentive regulation. A good illustrative case can be found in
Germany. In the past, German energy firms were quasi state-owned by the German
federal states (like, for example, Bavaria or Saxony) and local communities.
However, after the deregulation of the energy markets, there still exists strong
engagement in energy firms on the part of the German federal states, which are
holding large shares of equity. Additionally, often boards and other committees are
staffed with (former) politicians. Therefore, there is still a high degree of direct and
indirect political influence on energy firms in Germany such as RWE or EON.
In the past, German energy firms granted ample extra benefits to their employees,
like high wages, generous pension plans, broad social security programs, child care
for children of employees, etc. In addition, energy firms supported communal events
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like music festivals or sporting events. With the advent of the deregulation of the
energy sector and the beginning of incentive regulation, all these extra costs have
come under scrutiny because such costs are not directly related to the production,
distribution and sale of energy. However, cutting these extra costs is regarded as
illegitimate by workers and other beneficiaries, like local communities, because
these extra benefits are seen as social achievements that are important components
of worker-oriented and democratic firms (Mitbestimmung 2006). Therefore, labor
unions and shareholding communities exert pressure on executive managers via the
board to preserve these extra-social benefits by emphasizing the corporate social
responsibility of energy firms.
Also in New Zealand legitimacy played a role, when (local) grid firms which are
owned by consumer trusts, were exempted from incentive regulation. It was said,
that in case of trust ownership all benefits will accrue automatically to consumers. In
addition, it was assumed that consumers will feel responsible for a proper working
of management. That is consumers can directly participate in a grid firm’s decisions
and the management is directly accountable to consumers. Hence a redundant
control of those grid firms by the regulator was seen not only to be unnecessary, but
an additional layer of regulation was considered as illegitimate (Lewis and Meade
2007). However, today also trust owned grid firms are subject to incentive
regulation, which has triggered a public debate about the legitimacy of the
regulator’s interventions.
In general, legitimacy points to the important fact that besides efficiency also
other normative considerations play a role, if one is out to regulate an industry.
Disregarding legitimacy issues may hamper the proper implementation of incentive
regulation severely.
4.2.6 Corporate culture
Corporate culture and work attitudes also play an essential role in the effectiveness
of incentive channeling. In the past, energy firms were seen as vertically integrated
natural monopolies that were coordinated mostly by the commands of civil servants.
The influence of civil servants had a strong imprinting effect on the corporate
culture of energy firms, which adopted a corporate culture very similar to that of the
regulating bureaucracy (Russo 1992).
The interconnection of energy firms with the regulating body put forth a sort of
corporate culture less oriented to the needs of consumers, but to the needs of
politics. In addition, corporate culture of energy firms does not regard competition
as an important part of a market economy but instead is strongly adapted to the
accuracy of bureaucratic procedures (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). Therefore,
incentive regulation must cope with a corporate culture that processes incentives not
like a market, but like a bureaucratic sub-unit. In addition, in the past, key positions
of energy firms were occupied by engineers who were more interested in a secure
supply of energy than in cutting costs. As a consequence, the changes to more
market-oriented regulation have often been hampered by engineers in management
positions (Mueller and Carter 2007). The bureaucratic culture of energy firms has
been amplified in the past by the application of cost-plus regulation. Cost-plus
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regulation has led to a situation in which energy firms could not make any profits
but also would not see any losses. That is, profit-making did not have the same
importance in the energy industry that it did in other industries, or else it was not
seen as relevant at all. This situation had a lasting imprinting effect on the corporate
culture of energy firms, too (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). A grid firm, which is not
profitable under incentive regulation, may not be put under pressure to become more
efficient, because the management of the parent company may ‘‘forgive’’ the
management of the grid firm. Managers of parent companies of grid firms are more
likely to forgive inefficiencies, because they often contain the old routines of cost-
plus regulation within themselves (Russo 1992), although cost-plus regulation has
come to an end.
In sum, corporate culture and work attitudes constitute a set of important but
complex problems that are of the utmost importance when one is aiming to make
incentive regulation work. Even if one is of the opinion that, in the end, the
corporate culture of energy firms will converge towards that of firms in ordinary
markets, the corporate culture of energy firms represents a set of special problems
that have to be overcome in the transition period from highly regulated markets to
deregulated ones. Although it is intuitively clear that culture in general as well as
corporate culture in particular play an eminent role for the proper implementation of
incentive regulation, the economics approach is not well equipped to integrate
cultural reasoning into its considerations (for a recent discussion see for example
Guiso et al. 2006, 2009). One of the problems of the economics approach is the
insufficient integration of history (North 1990; David 1985; DiMaggio and Anheier
1990), which plays an important role for the transformation of regulatory regimes.
The approach of New Sociological Institutionalism can contribute to a better
understanding of the cultural embeddedness of energy regulation by highlighting the
historical path of regulations (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990).
5 Summary
This paper is an attempt to achieve more insight into the complex interplay between
‘‘external’’ market regulations and the ‘‘internal’’ regulations of firms. At first
glance, the relation between external and internal regulations seems trivial because
it is clear that there is such a relation and firms are well-advised to make adaptations
to corporate governance structures based on external regulations.
On a conceptual level, the relation between external and internal regulations is
not really problematic as long as firms are operating in markets without market
failures. Firms that are not able to adapt their organizational structures and modes of
corporate governance to external regulations will face bankruptcy. That is, in
markets without any severe failures, market processes work on both levels: There
will be efficient allocation of products on the market level as well as efficient
allocation of resources on the firm level. Thereby, market incentives will be
automatically channeled to the decision-making agents of firms. To be fair, all firms
may face serious problems in adapting their internal processes. However, in
competitive markets, there is always a pool of experimenting firms trying to isolate
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those adaptations, which will bring forth viable governance structures for the
adequate channeling of incentives. The evolutionary process of variation, selection
and retention ensures that corporate governance adapts to external regulations and
that incentive channeling will be workable. Therefore, from a macro perspective,
the interplay between external and internal regulations has not received much
attention in the past (Kole and Lehn 1997, 1999).
However, the need to understand in which way external and internal regulations
interact increases sharply if the automatic processing of external incentives through
the corporate governance structure of firms becomes systematically blocked. That
happens when there is no pool of firms competing with differentiated products and
different corporate governance structures but there instead exists a natural
monopoly. This has substantial consequences for the workability of incentive
channeling because now the regulator must consider the negotiation between
external and internal regulations.
In recent years, many countries have deregulated incumbent energy monopolies
and introduced new modes of regulation like incentive regulation. However, the
new incentive schemes are not an unmitigated success story (Verma et al. 1999). A
major problem seems to be the neoclassical framework that is imposed on the
analysis of energy markets. This is not to say that the neoclassical analysis of energy
markets is futile; however, it must be complemented by other theoretical
approaches.
It turns out that there are two restrictions of neoclassical analysis that are of great
importance, when one is aiming to make incentive regulation workable. The first is
the widely held ‘‘black box’’ view of firms. The second is the idea that agents
always make rational choices. Rational choice is a model of human action that can
be easily connected to welfare economics. That is, neoclassical theory allows
normative statements that are logically consecutive and coherent, but this sort of
analysis becomes dubious if it cannot adequately reflect reality (Schotter 1996).
One may discuss at length whether rational choice models can reflect reality well
enough, in order to derive meaningful propositions. However, in this paper it is
argued that it is useful to complement rational choice analysis with insights of
organizational behavior and New Sociological Institutionalism, in order to achieve a
more nuanced picture of the interrelationship between external and internal
incentives.
To make this point more accessible, a research agenda has been presented for the
analysis of incentive channeling in energy markets. The research agenda highlights
several aspects of energy market regulation that cannot be processed using
neoclassical theory alone.
The presented research agenda is by no means conclusive; there may be other
points that are also of interest for a better understanding of incentive channeling, or
the points of the research agenda may be subdivided for specialized research
questions. A more specialized research agenda might be necessary if one is out to
empirically test hypotheses concerning the channeling of incentives. For example,
from the perspective of New Sociological Institutionalism it is questioned that
straightforwardness and comprehensibility of incentives are ingredients for
improving rational decision making in organizations. Otherwise, in New
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Sociological Institutionalism it has been hypothesized that in case that organiza-
tional output is easily measurable technical efficiency may play a role for
organizational design. Public utilities are explicitly mentioned in this regard (see
Sect. 4.2.1). For that reason it seems worthwhile to test empirically whether
straightforwardness and comprehensibility of incentives do play a role for a proper
incentivizing of grid firms, and if that is the case to what degree. A conclusive
answer to this question would imply important theoretical as well as policy relevant
insights. On the theoretical level the meaning of organizational rationality could be
further clarified, which is a topical question in New Sociological Institutionalism
(Beckert 2010). On the policy level one would gain more insight in how to design
exactly the regulatory and institutional infrastructure of incentive regulation, in
order to make the targeting and channeling of incentives through the organizational
structure of grid firms more precise.
Another subsequent step could be the application of the proposed framework on
a specific country and to derive from this ‘‘case study’’ a refinement of the
framework. In particular, this sort of study would allow for a better understanding
of the institutional dynamics of incentive regulation. That is, a case study would
yield insights about the changes of a country’s mode of incentive regulation with
regard to the dimensions indicated by the proposed research agenda. The value of
such a study is apparent. If systems of incentive regulation adopt over time
automatically those governance modes which improve incentive channeling, then
one may conclude that contemporary systems of incentive regulation may be yet
not optimal, but are at least heading towards more efficiency. Otherwise, if those
improvements do not take place over time, then governments may consider more
vigorously the purposeful improvement of incentive channeling along the
proposed research agenda. For example, recently in the United Kingdom a 2 year
review of its system of incentive regulation has been completed (RIIO—
Revenue = Incentives ? Innovation ? Outputs model), which provides ample
material about how energy regulation has been targeted on energy firms in the last
years and how its focus shall be sharpened in the future (e.g. OFGEM 2010). In
this regard it is interesting that the RIIO-review proposes refined output measures
for a proper cost assessment of grid firms, which are intended to be more
accessible for shareholders and the public as well as more operational for
management. This is broadly in line with the here proposed improvements of
incentive regulation.
In the end the proposed framework may be understood as a first step toward a
better understanding of the crucial relationship between external regulations and
corporate governance in the case of public utilities, where the market process does
not automatically guarantee the proper channeling of incentives. The presented
insights may also be of interest for the regulatory body, which is interested in
carefully targeted incentive regulation. Furthermore, energy firms themselves may
be interested in the findings, which could help them make insightful adjustments to
their corporate governance under an incentive regulation regime.
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